'Only Nixon' by Humes James C.;Ryals Jarvis D.; & Jarvis D. Ryals

Author:Humes, James C.;Ryals, Jarvis D.; & Jarvis D. Ryals
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: UPA
Published: 2009-08-15T00:00:00+00:00

NOTES

1. Fairbank, 383-387

2. Ibid., 384

3. Ibid., 401-405

4. Ibid., 371

5. Chaozhu, 182

6. Fairbank, 401

7. videotape

8. Wenqian, 6

9. Ibid.

10. Ibid., 232

11. Ibid., cover

Chapter Six

The Handshake of History

While the Chinese coterie led by “the Gang of Four” plotted to derail any accessibility granted by Chairman Mao and Chou En-lai to the United States, so in America the State Department was stonewalling any initiative by President Nixon to open up a dialogue with the People’s Republic.

Henry Kissinger would jokingly complain to Chou En-lai in 1971 while preparing for the Nixon mission: “Our State Department is pro-Soviet.” In the sense that the Foreign Service careerists were more interested in arranging some sort of détente with the Soviet Union, than with China, it was true. Few old China hands remained in the State Department in the early ‘70s. Chinese speaking experts such as John Service had left with the taint of being pro-Mao and anti-Chiang Kai-shek.

On the other hand there were many careerists who had served either in the Soviet Union or other Slavic countries in Eastern Europe. Familiarity breeds favoritism, or at least a bias.

Compare the situation with the Middle East when President Truman in 1948, against the advice of the State Department, recognized Israel. The experts on the Middle East were all ‘Arabists,’ with knowledge of Arabic and the experience of postings in Cairo, Damascus and other capitals. There were no Zionists in the State Department. (Secretary of State George Marshall would quietly resign in protest to the Truman decision on Israel and Dean Acheson would succeed him.)

Presidents like Truman and Nixon soon realized when they headed the Executive Branch, including the State Department, that it was the career bureaucrats that shape most of the Departmental policy. In most cases, the Cabinet Secretaries are manipulated by the staff over which they preside.

In the State Department ‘going native’ means when the Ambassador to a foreign country begins to reflect and recommend the policies of the host country instead of the interests of the United States. In the same way, politically appointed Secretaries become advocates for the policies of the career bureaucrats who serve under them. It is different in corporate America where a new C.E.O. can enforce a change in the attitudes and priorities of personnel.

The State Department under Richard Nixon (Professor Humes served there briefly as a political appointee) consisted of mostly Democrats, at least in their party of registration. Although they were not partisan in their politics, their top political hero—if pressed—might have been Adlai Stevenson. Their first priority is their career and advancement in the Foreign Service. Because of that, “C.Y.A.” (Cover Your Ass) guides any implementation of policy. That passive approach mitigates against boldness in favor of consensus.

Nixon’s first choice for Secretary of State was Thomas E. Dewey, the twice nominated and twice defeated Republican presidential candidate. Dewey declined and recommended Bill Rogers, the one time Dewey protégé who became Attorney General in the second term of President Eisenhower. Rogers had been a close friend, and perhaps his closest advisor in the 1960 campaign.

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